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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a nite-automaton public-key cryptosystem. The compound nite
automaton of the public key of this cryptosystem consists of n+1 nite automata, where n is an
arbitrary positive integer. This cryptosystem contains FAPKC3 and FAPKC4 as special cases,
and can be used for encryption and for digital signature. We deal with the problem of generating
safe keys. Some results on generating nite automata with desired properties on invertibility are
briey mentioned. Relations of Ra Rb transformation sequences with linear Ra are characterized.
We prove that for inversion of nite automata by linear Ra Rb transformation method, in a sense,
only one linear Ra Rb transformation sequence is enough. We give a feasible inversion algorithm
for compound nite automaton, of which one component belongs to quasi-linear nite automata
and the other component belongs to a kind of weakly invertible or weak inverse nite automata
generated by linear Ra Rb inverse transformation. Some applications to the key-generator of
FAPKCs are discussed and several linear attacks are considered. c© 1999 Elsevier Science B.V.
All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Since the invention of public key cryptography [7], many public-key cryptosystems
of block type have been proposed and employed in the area of information security
[15, 12, 11, 8, 13, 16, 17]. A lot of public-key cryptosystems based on number theory,
e.g., RSA, are rather slow. On the other hand, several sequential public-key cryptosys-
tems based on the theory of nite automata were proposed [21, 22, 9, 25{27]. Those
nite-automaton public-key cryptosystems (FAPKCs) have advantages such as better
performance, a relatively short public key, and the capability of digital signature.
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A user’s public key of FAPKCs consists of a compound of two nite automata
with some invertibility and initial states. If one of the nite automata is linear and the
other’s delay step is 0 (for example, FAPKC0 [21], FAPKC1 [22] and FAPKC93 [9]),
the FAPKCs are insecure [6, 20, 1]. However, if the two nite automata are nonlinear
or one of them is linear and the other’s delay step is greater than 0, the FAPKCs
seem secure whenever a so-called linear Ra Rb check process is included in the key-
generator. It is shown in [19, 29, 28] that such FAPKCs are also immune of various
linear attacks such as by linear Ra Rb transformation, by reducing to reduced echelon
matrix [14], and by reducing canonical diagonal form of -matrix [5]. FAPKC2 [22],
FAPKC3 [25], and FAPKC4 [26] are examples of such FAPKCs.
In general, FAPKC2 (the second variety [22]) can resist attacks proposed in [6, 20, 1].
However, the key-generating scheme for FAPKC2 suggested by Bao and Igarashi [1]
is not secure, as it cannot resist linear Ra; Rb attack [19].
FAPKC3 and a software implementation are documented in [25]. Its key generator
selects automata as user’s key by means of linear and/or nonlinear Ra; Rb transforma-
tion and their reverse transformation. It sieves out such a key in which the compound
automaton’s weak inverse can be found out by linear Ra; Rb transformation method
[25, 19]. A secure and ecient software implementation for FAPKC4 and FAPKC2
may be carried out similarly as for FAPKC3.
This paper generalizes these nite-automaton public-key cryptosystems and deals
with some security issues. We rst present some preliminaries on automata theory in
Section 2. In Section 3 we propose a nite-automaton public-key cryptosystem. In its
public key, the compound nite automaton consists of n+1 nite automata, where n is
an arbitrary positive integer. This cryptosystem contains FAPKC0, FAPKC1, FAPKC3,
and FAPKC4 as special cases. In Section 4, we discuss the problem of generating safe
keys.
Section 4 is mainly based on the technical report [19]. After mentioning briey
results on nite automata with desired property on invertibility [23], we focus on
Ra Rb transformation. We rst show some relations of Ra Rb transformation sequences
with linear Ra. For inversion of nite automata by linear Ra Rb transformation method,
in a sense, only one linear Ra Rb transformation sequence is enough. We then give a
feasible inversion algorithm for compound nite automaton, of which one component
belongs to quasi-linear nite automata [3] and the other component belongs to a kind
of weakly invertible or weak inverse nite automata generated by linear Ra Rb inverse
transformation [23]. Finally, some applications to the key-generator of the FAPKC are
discussed and several linear attacks are considered.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Invertibility of nite automata
In this paper, a nite automaton (or sequential machine), M; means a quintuple
hX; Y; S; ; i; where X is a nonempty nite set (the input alphabet of M), Y a nonempty
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nite set (the output alphabet of M), S a nonempty nite set (the state alphabet
of M),  : S X ! S a single-valued mapping (the next state function of M), and
 : S X !Y a single-valued mapping (the output function of M).
For any set A; we use AN to denote the set of all words (nite sequences) over A in-
cluding the empty word ; and A! to denote the set of all innite-length words (innite
sequences) over A. We extend the domains of  and  to S XN and S  (XN [X!);
respectively, as follows:
(s; )= s; (s; x)= ((s; ); x);
(s; )= ; (s; x0)= (s; x)((s; x); 0);
s2 S; x2X; 2XN ; 0 2XN [X!:
In other words, with an initial state s(0) of M; an input sequence x(0); x(1); : : : of M
leads to a state sequence s(0); s(1); : : : of M and an output sequence y(0); y(1); : : : of
M according to
s(i + 1)= (s(i); x(i)); y(i)= (s(i); x(i)); i=0; 1; : : : :
Let M = hX; Y; S; ; i and M 0= hY; X; S 0; 0; 0i be two nite automata, and  a nonneg-
ative integer.
In his seminal paper [10], Human introduced the concept of -order information
lossless that we call weakly invertible with delay  [18]. M is said to be weakly
invertible with delay  (or -order information-lossless) if for any s in S and xi in X;
i=0; 1; : : : ; ; x0 can be uniquely determined by s and (s; x0 : : : x).
For any states s2 S and s0 2 S 0; if for any 2X! there exists 0 2XN with length
 such that 0(s0; (s; )) = 0; then (s0; s) is said to be a match pair with delay 
or we say that s0 matches s with delay .
M 0 is said to be a weak inverse with delay  of M if for any s in S there exists s0
in S 0 such that (s0; s) is a match pair with delay .
It is well known that M is weakly invertible with delay  if and only if there exists
a nite automaton M 0 such that M 0 is a weak inverse with delay  of M .
2.2. Compound nite automata
If ’ is a mapping from Y k X h+1 to Y; and if a nite automaton M = hX; Y; Y k X h;
; i can be dened by
y(i)=’(y(i − 1); : : : ; y(i − k); x(i); : : : ; x(i − h)); i=0; 1; : : : ;
i.e.,
(hy−1; : : : ; y−k ; x−1; : : : ; x−hi; x0)= hy0; : : : ; y−k+1; x0; : : : ; x−h+1i;
(hy−1; : : : ; y−k ; x−1; : : : ; x−hi; x0)=y0;
y0 =’(y−1; : : : ; y−k ; x0; x−1; : : : ; x−h);
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then M is said to be an (h; k)-order memory nite automaton, denoted by M’. In case
of k =0; M’ is said to be an h-order input memory nite automaton.
For any two nite automata Mi= hXi; Yi; Si; i; ii; i=1; 2 with Y1 =X2; we use
C(M1; M2) to denote the superposition of M1 and M2; i.e., the nite automaton hX1; Y2;
S1 S2; ; i; where
(hs1; s2i; x)= h1(s1; x); 2(s2; 1(s1; x))i;
(hs1; s2i; x)= 2(s2; 1(s1; x));
s1 2 S1; s2 2 S2; x2X1:
In [21] another kind of combination of nite automata, C0(M1; M2); is dened. Let g
be a mapping from Ur Vp+1 to U; and f a mapping from Wt+1 to V . C0(Mf;Mg)
is a (p+ t; r)-order memory nite automaton dened by
u(i) = g(u(i − 1); : : : ; u(i − r); f(w(i); : : : ; w(i − t));
: : : ; f(w(i − p); : : : ; w(i − p− t)));
i=0; 1; : : : :
For any two nite automata Mi= hXi; Yi; Si; i; ii; i=1; 2 with X1 =X2; s1 2 S1 and
s2 2 S2 are said to be equivalent, if 1(s1; )= 2(s2; ) holds for any 2XN1 .
Theorem 1 (Tao and Chen [21]). Let s= hu−1; : : : ; u−r ; w−1; : : : ; w−p−ti be a state of
C0(Mf;Mg). Let sf = hw−1; : : : ; w−ti and sg= hu−1; : : : ; u−r ; v−1; : : : ; v−pi; where vi=f
(wi; : : : ; wi−t); i= − 1; : : : ;−p: Then the state hsf; sgi of C(Mf;Mg) and s are equiv-
alent. Moreover; if
v−p : : : v−1v0v1 : : : = f(hw−p−1; : : : ; w−p−ti; w−p : : : w−1w0w1 : : :)
and
u0u1 : : : = g(hu−1; : : : ; u−r ; v−1; : : : ; v−pi; v0v1 : : :);
then
u0u1 : : : = (hu−1; : : : ; u−r ; w−1; : : : ; w−p−ti; w0w1 : : :);
where f; g and  are output functions of Mf;Mg and C0(Mf;Mg); respectively.
For n>0; we use C0(M0; M1; : : : ; Mn) to denote C0(C0(M0; M1; : : : ; Mn−1); Mn); and
C(M0; M1; : : : ; Mn) to denote C(C(M0; M1; : : : ; Mn−1); Mn). For n=0; C0(M0; : : : ; Mn) and
C(M0; : : : ; Mn) mean M0. Clearly, C0(C0(M0; M1; : : : ; Mn−1); Mn)=C0(M0; C0(M1; : : : ;
Mn)); C(C(M0; M1; : : : ; Mn−1); Mn)=C(M0; C(M1; : : : ; Mn)); that is, the associative law
holds.
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3. Multi-component nite automaton public-key cryptosystem
3.1. Theoretical fundamental
For any (r; t)-order memory nite automaton M = hX; Y; S; ; i; any (r0; t0)-order
memory nite automaton M 0= hY; X; S 0; 0; 0i; and any nonnegative integer ; we use
PI(M;M 0; ) to denote the following condition:
For any state s= hy−1; : : : ; y−t ; x−1; : : : ; x−ri of M and any state s0= hx−1; : : : ; x−t0 ;
y−1; : : : ; y−r0i of M 0; and any x0; x1; : : : 2X; y; y+1; : : : 2Y; if y0y1 : : : = (s; x0x1 : : :);
then x0x1 : : : = 0(s0; yy+1 : : :).
For any i; 06i6n; let Xi be the column vector space over GF(q) with dimensions
li. Let X =Xn and Y be the column vector space over GF(q) with dimensions m.
For any i; 16i6n; let Mi= hXi; Xi−1; X rii ; i; ii be a ri-order input memory nite
automaton, and Mi = hXi−1; Xi; X rii X ii−1; i ; i i be a (i; ri)-order memory nite au-
tomaton, and i6ri.





0 ; 0 ; 0 i be a (r0; t0)-
order and a (r0 ; t0 )-order memory nite automaton, respectively, and 06r0.
Theorem 2. Assume that Mi ; Mi and i satisfy PI(Mi ; Mi; i); i=0; : : : ; n. Let s(i)−bi−1




−bi−1−1; : : : ; x
(i−1)
−bi−1−ii be a state of Mi ; i=1; : : : ; n; and
x(0)−b0 ; : : : ; x
(0)
−1 2X0;








−bi−1 : : : x
(i−1)
−1 );
s(i)0 = i (s(i)−bi−1 ; x
(i−1)
−bi−1 : : : x
(i−1)
−1 );
i=1; : : : ; n;
(1)
where b0 = r0 − 0; bi= bi−1 + ri − i; i=1; : : : ; n. Let s(0)0 = hx(0)−1; : : : ; x(0)−t0 ; y−1; : : : ;
y−r0 i be a state of M0 . If
x(0)0 x
(0)




0 ; y0y1 : : :);
x(i)0 x
(i)








1 : : :); i=1; : : : ; n; (2)
then
y0y1 : : : = 0(s0; x(n) x
(n)
+1 : : :); (3)
where 0 is the output function of C0(Mn; : : : ; M1; M0); s0= hy−1; : : : ; y−t0 ; x(n)−1;
: : : ; x(n)−ri; r= r0 +   + rn and = 0 +   + n.
Proof. Suppose that (2) holds. From (1) and the part on Mi in (2), it is easy to
obtain that


















1 : : :);
148 R. Tao, S. Chen / Theoretical Computer Science 226 (1999) 143{172
i=1; : : : ; n. Since PI(Mi ; Mi; i) holds, it yields that






1 : : : = i(s
(i); x(i)−bi−1+i x
(i)
−bi−1+i+1 : : :); (4)
i=1; : : : ; n; where s(i) = hx(i)−bi−1+i−1; : : : ; x
(i)
−bii. Since PI(M0 ; M0; 0) holds, from the
part on M0 in (2), we have
y0y1 : : := 0(s(0); x(0)0 x
(0)
0+1 : : :); (5)
where s(0) = hy−1; : : : ; y−t0 ; x(0)0−1; : : : ; x
(0)
0−r0i.
For 16i6n − 1; let 0i be the output function of C0(Mn; : : : ; Mi). From (4) for
i= n− 1; n; by Theorem 1 we have
x(n−2)−bn−2x
(n−2)
−bn−2+1 : : :






−bn−2+n−1+n+1 : : :):
Suppose that we have proven that
x(i)−bi x
(i)
−bi+1 : : :






−bi+i+1++n+1 : : :)
for i>1; we prove the case of 0i . From the above equation and (4), noticing −bi
=−bi−1 + i − ri; applying Theorem 1, we obtain
x(i−1)−bi−1x
(i−1)
−bi−1+1 : : :






−bi−1+i++n+1 : : :):
Thus the above equation holds for the case of i=1; that is,
x(0)−b0x
(0)
−b0+1 : : :






−b0+1++n+1 : : :):
Since (5) holds, from Theorem 1 it immediately follows that
y0y1 : : := 0(s0; x(n) x
(n)
+1 : : :);
that is, (3) holds.
Theorem 3. Assume that PI(Mi;Mi ; i); i=0; : : : ; n hold. Let s0= hy−1; : : : ; y−t0 ;
x(n)−1; : : : ; x
(n)
−ri be a state of C0(Mn; : : : ; M1; M0) with the output function 0; where
r= r0 +   + rn. Let
x(i−1)−r0−−ri−1 : : : x
(i−1)
−1
= i(hx(i)−r0−−ri−1−1; : : : ; x
(i)
−r0−−rii; x(i)−r0−−ri−1 : : : x(i)−1) (6)
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for i= n; n− 1; : : : ; 1; and








1 : : : = 





1 : : : = 

i (hx(i)−1; : : : ; x(i)−ri ; x(i−1)i−1 ; : : : ; x
(i−1)
0 i; x(i−1)i x(i−1)i+1 : : :) (9)
for i=1; : : : ; n− 1; then
x(n)0 x
(n)
1 : : := 

n (hx(n)−1; : : : ; x(n)−rn ; x(n−1)n−1 ; : : : ; x
(n−1)
0 i; x(n−1)n x(n−1)n+1 : : :): (10)
Proof. Let si= hx(i)−1; : : : ; x(i)−rii for 16i6n; s0n= s0 and s0i = hy−1; : : : ; y−t0 ; x(i)−1; : : : ;
x(i)−r0−−rii for 06i6n − 1. For any i; 0<i6n; since (6) holds, the state s0i of
C0(Mi; : : : ; M1; M0) and the state hsi; s0i−1i of C(Mi; C0(Mi−1; : : : ; M1; M0)) are equiv-
alent. Thus, the state s0(= s0n) of C
0(Mn; : : : ; M1; M0) and the state hsn; : : : ; s1; s00i of
C(Mn; : : : ; M1; M0) are equivalent.
Suppose that (7) holds. Let
x(n−1)0 x
(n−1)












1 : : :) (12)
for i= n− 1; n− 2; : : : ; 1. Since s0 and hsn; : : : ; s1; s00i are equivalent, (7) yields




1 : : :): (13)
To prove x(n−1)0 x
(n−1)




1 : : : ; we now prove by simple induction that
x(i)0 x
(i)




1 : : : for 06i6n− 1. Since PI(M0; M0 ; 0) holds, by (13) we have
x(0)0 x
(0)
1 : : := 

0 (hx(0)−1; : : : ; x(0)t0 ; y0−1; : : : ; y0−r0 i; y0y0+1 : : :):
From (8) it follows that x(0)0 x
(0)








1 : : := x
(i−1)
0
x(i−1)1 : : : is true and i6n−1. We prove that x(i)0 x(i)1 : : := x(i)0 x(i)1 : : : . Since PI(Mi;Mi ; i)
holds, noticing x(i−1)j = x
(i−1)
j ; (12) yields
x(i)0 x
(i)
1 : : := 

i (hx(i)−1; : : : ; x(i)−ri ; x(i−1)i−1 ; : : : ; x
(i−1)
0 i; x(i−1)i x(i−1)i+1 : : :):
From (9), we have x(i)0 x
(i)




1 : : : .
Since PI(Mn;Mn ; n) holds, noticing x(n−1)j = x(n−1)j ; (11) yields
x(n)0 x
(n)
1 : : := 

n (hx(n)−1; : : : ; x(n)−rn ; x(n−1)n−1 ; : : : ; x
(n−1)
0 i; x(n−1)n x(n−1)n+1 : : :);
that is, (10) holds.
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Corollary 1. If condition (6) is replaced by
x(i−1)−r00−r1−−ri−1 : : : x
(i−1)
−1




−r00−r1−−ri−1 : : : x
(i)
−1);
where r00 =min(r0; t

0 ); then Theorem 3 still holds.
Proof. Since Mi; i=1; : : : ; n are input memory nite automata, x
(0)
−1; : : : ; x
(0)
−t0 in (8),
x(i)−1; : : : ; x
(i)




−r+1; : : : ; x
(n)
−r+r0−r00 .
3.2. Algorithm of FAPKC
Based on the results of previous subsection, we now propose a public-key cryptosys-
tem for both encryption and signature. For both purposes we require that m= l0 =   =
ln; and we denote Xi by X 1 .
Choose a common q and m for all users. Take alphabets X and Y as the column
vector spaces over GF(q) with dimension m.
A user, say A; choose his/her own public key and secret key as follows:
(1) Construct an (r0 ; t0 )-order memory nite automaton M0 = hY; X; S0 ; 0 ; 0 i and
an (r0; t0)-order memory nite automaton M0 = hX; Y; S0; 0; 0i satisfying conditions
PI(M0 ; M0; 0) and PI(M0; M0 ; 0).
(2) For each i; 16i6n; construct an ri-order input memory nite automaton Mi=
hX; X; Si; i; ii and a (i; ri)-order memory nite automaton Mi = hX; X; Si ; i ; i i sat-
isfying conditions PI(Mi ; Mi; i) and PI(Mi;Mi ; i).
(3) Construct the nite automaton C0(Mn; : : : ; M1; M0)=hX; Y; S; 0; 0ifromM0; : : : ; Mn.
(4) Let b0 = r0 − 0; bi= bi−1 + ri − i; i=1; : : : ; n. Assume that b0 =   = bc−1
= 0; i.e., rj = j; j=0; : : : ; c−1; for some c; 06c6n. Choose arbitrary y−1; : : : ; y−t0 2
Y; x(c)−1; : : : ; x
(c)
−bc 2X . For each i; c + 16i6n; choose an arbitrary state s
(i)
−bi−1 =




−bi−1−1; : : : ; x
(i−1)
−bi−1−ii of Mi . Compute












s(i)0 = i (s(i)−bi−1 ; x
(i−1)
−bi−1 : : : x
(i−1)
−1 )
for i= c + 1; : : : ; n. Take s(0); ins = hy−1; : : : ; y−min(t0 ; r0 )i; s
(c);out
s = hx(c)−1; : : : ; x(c)−bci; s
(i)
s =
s(i)0 ; i= c + 1; : : : ; n; soutv = hy−1; : : : ; y−t0i; sinv = hx(n)−1; : : : ; x(n)−bni.
1 If the public key system is only for encryption, ln6   6l06m is enough. If it is only for signature,
ln>   >l0>m suces.
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(5) Choose arbitrary y−1; : : : ; y−r0 +0 2Y; and x
(n)
−1; : : : ; x
(n)
−r0 2X; where r0= r00 + r1 +
  + rn; r00 = min(r0; t0 ). Compute
x(i−1)−r00−r1−−ri−1 : : : x
(i−1)
−1




−r00−r1−−ri−1 : : : x
(i)
−1);
i= n; n − 1; : : : ; 1. Take soute = hy−1; : : : ; y−min(r0 −0 ; t0)i; sine = hx
(n)
−1; : : : ; x
(n)
−r0i; s(0);outd =
hx(0)−1; : : : ; x(0)−min(r0 ;t0 )i; s
(0); in
d = hy−1; : : : ; y−r0 +0i; s
(i);out
d = hx(i)−1; : : : ; x(i)−rii; i=1; : : : ; n.
(6) The public key of the user A is






e ; 0 +   + n:
The secret key of the user A is









Any user, say B; wants to send a plaintext x0 : : : xn to a user A: B rst suxes
any 0 +    + n digits, say xn+1 : : : xn+0++n ; to the plaintext. Then using A’s pub-
lic key C0(Mn; : : : ; M1; M0); soute = hy−1; : : : ; y−min(r0 −0 ; t0)i and sine = hx
(n)
−1; : : : ; x
(n)
−r0i; B
computes the ciphertext y0 : : : yn+0++n as follows:
y0 : : : yn+0++n = 
0(s0; x0 : : : xn+0++n);
where
s0= hy−1; : : : ; y−t0 ; x−1; : : : ; x−ri;
x−r+r0−t0 −1; : : : ; x−r are arbitrarily chosen from X when t

0 <r0; and y−r0 +0−1; : : : ; y−t0
are arbitrarily chosen from Y when r0 − 0<t0.
3.2.2. Decryption
From the ciphertext y0 : : : yn+0++n ; A can retrieve the plaintext using his secret
key as follows. Using M0 ; : : : ; Mn ; s(0);outd = hx(0)−1; : : : ; x(0)−min(r0 ; t0 )i; s
(0); in
d = hy−1; : : : ;
y−r0 +0i; s
(i);out
d = hx(i)−1; : : : ; x(i)−rii; i=1; : : : ; n in his/her secret key, A computes
x(0)0 x
(0)




0 (hx(0)−1; : : : ; x(0)t0 ; y0−1; : : : ; y0−r0 i; y0y0+1 : : : yn+0++n);
x(i)0 x
(i)
1 : : : x
(i)
n+i+1++n
= i (hx(i)−1; : : : ; x(i)−ri ; x(i−1)i−1 ; : : : ; x
(i−1)
0 i; x(i−1)i x(i−1)i+1 : : : x
(i−1)
n+i++n);
i=1; : : : ; n;
where x(0)−r0−1; : : : ; x
(0)
t0
may be arbitrarily chosen when r0<t0 . Then the plaintext x0 : : : xn
is equal to x(n)0 x
(n)
1 : : : x
(n)
n .
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3.2.3. Signature
To sign a message y0 : : : yn; user A rst suxes any 0 +    + n digits, say
yn+1 : : : yn+0++n ; to the message. Then using his/her secret key M






hy−1; : : : ; y−min(t0 ; r0 )i; s
(c);out
s = hx(c)−1; : : : ; x(c)−bci; s
(i)
s ; i= c + 1; : : : ; n; A computes
x(0)0 x
(0)






s ; y0y1 : : : yn+0++n);
x(i)0 x
(i)










1 : : : x
(i−1)
n+0++n); i=1; : : : ; n;
where
s(0)s = hx(0)−1; : : : ; x(0)−t0 ; y−1; : : : y−r0 i;
s(i)s = hx(i)−1; : : : ; x(i)−ri ; x(i−1)−1 ; : : : ; x(i−1)i i; i=1; : : : ; c;
x(0)−b0−1; : : : ; x
(0)
−t0 are arbitrarily chosen from X in case of c=0; x
(0)




−1; : : : ;
x(i)−ri ; i=1; : : : ; c − 1; x(c)−bc−1; : : : ; x
(c)
−rc ; and x
(i−1)
−1 ; : : : ; x
(i−1)
i ; i=1; : : : ; c; are arbitrarily
chosen from X in case of c>0; and y−t0−1; : : : ; y−r0 are arbitrarily chosen from Y in
case of t0<r0 .
3.2.4. Validation
Any user, say B; can verify the validity of the signature x(n)0 x
(n)
1 : : : x
(n)
n+0++n as
follows. Using C0(Mn; : : : ; M1; M0); soutv = hy−1; : : : ; y−t0i; sinv = hx(n)−1; : : : ; x(n)−r−i in A’s
public key, B computes
0(s0; x(n) x
(n)
+1 : : : x
(n)
n+);
which would coincide with the message y0 : : : yn; where s0= hy−1; : : : ; y−t0 ; x(n)−1; : : : ;
x(n)−ri; r= r0 +   + rn and = 0 +   + n.
This cryptosystem contains FAPKC0 [21], FAPKC1 [22], FAPKC3 [25] and FAPKC4
[26] as special cases. Table 1 lists main parameters concerned.
For encryption or signature, nondeterministics of initial state depends on the choice
of parameters. Table 2 lists freedoms (d1; d2 and d3) for FAPKC3 and FAPKC4 in case
of r0>0 and Table 3 for the case r0 = 0; where d1 = (r0 _−t0 )+(t0 _−(r0 _−0)); d2 =
(t0 _−(r0 _−0))+(r0 _−t0); d3 = t0 +(r0 _−t0)+21; and a _−b = a−b if a>b; 0 otherwise.
Table 1 Parameters for FAPKCs
Algorithms n M0 linearity r0 t0 r0 t0 0 1
FAPKC4 1 k0 + 0 h0 h0 k0 0 1
FAPKC3 1 h0 k0 k0 + 0 h0 0 1
FAPKC1 1 linear r 0  r  0
FAPKC0 1 linear    0  0
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Table 2 Freedom of initial states for FAPKC3 and FAPKC4, case r0>0
Algorithms r0 t0 r0 t0 0 d1 d2
(encryption) (signature)
FAPKC4 k0 + 0 h0 h0 k0 0 20 0
FAPKC3 h0 k0 k0 + 0 h0 0 0 20
Table 3 Freedom of initial states for FAPKC3 and FAPKC4, case r0 = 0
Algorithms r0 t0 r0 t0 0 1 d1 d3
(encryption) (signature)
FAPKC4 0 h0 h0 0 0 1 20 21
FAPKC3 0 k0 k0 + 0 0 0 1 0 20 + 21
4. On the generation of safe keys
4.1. Generating nite automata concerned
In [23], we proved that nite automata Mi and Mi satisfying conditions PI(Mi ; Mi)
and/or PI(Mi;Mi ) do exist. We give a brief introduction about this result here.
Let X and Y be column vector spaces over GF(q) of dimensions l and m; re-
spectively. Let x(i) and y(i) be column vectors over GF(q) of dimensions l and m;
respectively. Let  be a nonnegative integer.
Rule Ra: Let eqc(i) be an equation in the form of
fc(xi; : : : ; xi−h; yi+c; : : : ; yi−k) = 0
for some one-valued mapping fc : X h+1Y c+k+1!Y . Let ’c be a transformation on
eqc(i) and let eq0c(i) be the transformational result in the form of
f0c (xi; : : : ; xi−h; yi+c; : : : ; yi−k) = 0
for some one-valued mapping f0c : X
h+1Y c+k+1!Y . If eqc(i) and eq0c(i) are equiv-
alent, then eq0c(i) is said to be obtained from eqc(i) by Rule Ra using ’c; denoted
by eqc(i)
Ra[’c]−! eq0c(i). If the transformation ’c is to multiply two sides of eqc(i) by a
nonsingular matrix Pc over GF(q) from the left, we denote eqc(i)
Ra[Pc]−! eq0c(i).
Let  r(zi; : : : ; zi−r) be a column vector. In this paper, Ra is called linear, if the
transformation ’c is to multiply both sides of eqc(i) from the left by a nonsingular
matrix Pc over GF(q) such that the rst rc rows of B00c(yi+c; : : : ; yi−k) in the expression
f0c (xi; : : : ; xi−h; yi+c; : : : ; yi−k)
= f00c(yi+c; : : : ; yi−k) +
hP
j=0
B0jc(yi+c; : : : ; yi−k) h0(xi−j; : : : ; xi−j−h0) (14)
for some h06h are linearly independent over GF(q) and the last m − rc rows of
B00c(yi+c; : : : ; yi−k) are 0.
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Rule Rb: Assume that eq0c(i) is an equation in the form of
f0c (xi; : : : ; xi−h; yi+c; : : : ; yi−k) = 0
for some one-valued mapping f0c : X
h+1Y c+k+1!Y and that the last m− rc compo-
nents of the left side of eq0c(i) are independent of xi. Let eqc+1(i) be the equation
E0cf
0
c (xi; : : : ; xi−h; yi+c; : : : ; yi−k)
E00c f
0
c (xi+1; : : : ; xi+1−h; yi+1+c; : : : ; yi+1−k)

= 0;
where E0c and E
00
c are submatrices of the rst rc rows and of the last m− rc rows of the
mm identity matrix, respectively. Then eqc+1(i) is said to be obtained from eq0c(i)
by Rule Rb; denoted by eq0c(i)
Rb[rc]−! eqc+1(i).
In this paper, if the rst rc rows of B00c(yi+c; : : : ; yi−k) in (14) are linearly independent





Rb[rj+1]−! eqj+1(i); j = 0; 1; : : : ; − 1
by
eq0(i)
Ra[’0]−! eq00(i) Rb[r1]−! eq1(i)
Ra[’1]−!    (15)
Rb[r−1]−! eq−1(i) Ra[’−1]−! eq0−1(i) Rb[r]−! eq(i):
From the proof of Theorem 1 in [23], we have:
Proposition 1. Let M = hX; Y; Y t X r; ; i be an (r; t)-order memory nite automa-
ton over GF(q) dened by
y(i) = f(y(i − 1); : : : ; y(i − t); x(i); : : : ; x(i − r)); i = 0; 1; : : : : (16)
Let eq0(i) be the equation
− y(i) + f(y(i − 1); : : : ; y(i − t); x(i); : : : ; x(i − r)) = 0 (17)
and (15) be a Ra Rb transformation sequence. Let f be a mapping from X r Y +t+1
to X . Assume that for any parameters x(i−1); : : : ; x(i−r); y(i+); : : : ; y(i− t); x(i) =
f (x(i − 1); : : : ; x(i − r); y(i + ); : : : ; y(i − t)) is a solution of eq(i). Let M =
hY; X; X r Y +t ; ; i be a (+ t; r)-order memory nite automaton dened by
x(i) = f (x(i − 1); : : : ; x(i − r); y0(i); : : : ; y0(i − − t)); i = 0; 1; : : : : (18)
Then for any state s0 = hx(−1); : : : ; x(−r); y0(−1); : : : ; y0(−− t)i of M and for any
y0(0); y0(1); : : : in Y;
x(0)x(1) : : : = (s0 ; y0(0)y0(1) : : :)
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implies
y0(0)y0(1) : : : = (hy0(−1); : : : ; y0(−t); x(− 1); : : : ; x(− r)i; x()x(+ 1) : : :):
The following result comes from [23, Corollary 1 of Theorem 4].
Proposition 2. Let M be dened by (16). Let eq0(i) be Eq. (17) and (15) a Ra Rb
transformation sequence. Let f be a mapping from X r  Y +t+1 to X . Assume that
for any parameters x(i − 1); : : : ; x(i − r); y(i + ); : : : ; y(i − t); if x(i) is a solution
of eq(i) ; then x(i) = f (x(i − 1); : : : ; x(i − r); y(i + ); : : : ; y(i − t)). Let M be a
( + t; r)-order memory nite automaton dened by (18): Then for any state s0 =
hy(−1); : : : ; y(−t); x(−1); : : : ; x(−r)i of M and any x(0); x(1); : : : in X;
y(0)y(1) : : : = (s0; x(0)x(1) : : :)
implies
x(0)x(1) : : : = (hx(−1); : : : ; x(−r); y(− 1); : : : ; y(−t)i; y()y(+ 1) : : :):
A construction method of an automaton M; for which there exists a Ra Rb transfor-
mation sequence satisfying the condition in Proposition 1 and/or in Proposition 2, was
also given in [23].
Propositions 1 and 2 provide an inversion method of M by means of Ra Rb trans-
formation. It is said that a weak inverse of M can be obtained by linear Ra Rb
transformation method, if there exists a linear Ra Rb transformation (15) such that for
any parameters x(i−1); : : : ; x(i−r); y(i+); : : : ; y(i− t); the equation eq(i) has at most
one solution x(i). It is said that an original weak inverse of M can be obtained by
linear Ra Rb transformation method, if there exists a linear Ra Rb transformation (15)
such that for any parameters x(i − 1); : : : ; x(i − r); y(i + ); : : : ; y(i − t); the equation
eq(i) has a solution x(i). Clearly, in case of l = m; a weak inverse of M can be
obtained by linear Ra Rb transformation method if and only if an original weak inverse
of M can be obtained by linear Ra Rb transformation method.
4.2. Linear Ra Rb transformation test
We suggest that the key-generator includes a check process to sieve out such a
C0(Mn; : : : ; M0); of which an original weak inverse (or a weak inverse) can be ob-
tained by linear Ra Rb transformation method. That is, from eq0(i) corresponding
to C0(Mn; : : : ; M0); construct a linear Ra Rb transformation (15) and check whether
or not for any parameters x(i − 1); : : : ; x(i − r); y(i + ); : : : ; y(i − t); the equation
eq(i) has a (or at most one) solution x(i). If there is a linear Ra Rb transforma-
tion satisfying the condition mentioned above, this C0(Mn; : : : ; M0) is sieved out. Al-
though the number of these linear Ra Rb transformations is innity, only one lin-
ear Ra Rb transformation sequence is enough to check due to the following results
(cf. Theorems 4 and 5).
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Denote2
64
 r(zi; : : : ; zi−r)
...
 r(zi−p; : : : ; zi−p−r)
3
75
by  z;ir;p. In this subsection, for c>0; let eqc(i) be
c0c + [A−c; c; : : : ; Akc] 
y; i+c
k0 ;c+k + [B0c; : : : ; Bhc] 
x; i
h0 ; h=0 (19)
and let eq0c(i) be
c00c + [A
0




k0 ;c+k + [B
0









jc have m rows. Similarly, for c>0; let eqc(i) be
c0c + [ A−c; c; : : : ; Akc] 
y; i+c
k0 ;c+k + [ B0c; : : : ; Bhc] 
x; i
h0 ; h = 0
and let eq0c(i) be
c00c + [ A
0




k0 ; c+k + [ B
0
0c; : : : ; B
0
hc] h0 ; h=0;




jc have m rows.




and En;−r = En;n−r for 06r6n. Denote the n r zero matrix by 0n; r . Also, we use







with n matrices P.























(a) if Q0; c−1 is nonsingular and (21) is linear; then rc−1 = rc−1.
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Proof. (a) Suppose that Q0; c−1 is nonsingular and (21) is linear. Then rc−1 and rc−1
are the ranks of B0; c−1 and B0; c−1; respectively. Since B0; c−1 =Q0; c−1B0; c−1 and Q0c
is nonsingular, we have rc−1 = rc−1.
(b) Let R1 =Em; rc−1 ; R2 = [0m; rc−1Em0m;m−rc−1 ]; R3 =DIA Pc−1 ;2;
R4 =

Q0; c−1 Q1; c−1 : : : Qc−1; c−1 0 0




R5 =DIAP−1c−1 ; c+2; R6 =Em(c+2); rc−1 ; R7 =DIAEm;−rc−1 ; c+2. Then we have R
−1
5 =
DIAPc−1 ; c+2; R
−1
6 =Em(c+2);−rc−1 ; R
−1
7 =DIAEm; rc−1 ; c+2.
Let R=R1R2R3R4R5R6R7 and partition R= [Q0c; : : : ; Qc+1; c]; where Qjc has m





















where Q1j; c−1 and Q
4
j; c−1 are rc−1 rc−1 and (m− rc−1) (m− rc−1) matrices, respec-





1; c−1 : : : Q
0
c−1; c−1 0 0
















2 : : : Q
4













c−1 0 0 0

:
Let R2R3R4R5R6 = [ Q0c; : : : ; Qc+1; c]; where Qjc has m columns. To prove Q
3
0; c−1 = 0;
by (22) we have B0; c−1 =Q0; c−1B0; c−1. Thus
Pc−1 B0; c−1 = Pc−1Q0; c−1P−1c−1(Pc−1B0; c−1)=Q
0
0; c−1(Pc−1B0; c−1): (26)
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From (20) and (21), the rst rc−1 rows of Pc−1B0; c−1 are linearly independent and
both the last m − rc−1 rows of Pc−1B0; c−1 and the last m − rc−1 rows of Pc−1 B0; c−1
are 0. From (26) it follows that the submatrix Q30; c−1 of the rst rc−1 columns and
the last m − rc−1 rows of Q00; c−1 is 0. Since Q30; c−1 = 0 yields Qc+1; c=0; we obtain
Qc+1; c=R1 Qc+1; cEm;−rc−1 = 0.
Suppose that Q0; c−1 is nonsingular and that (21) is linear. Since Pc−1; Pc−1 and
Q0; c−1 are nonsingular, Q00; c−1 is nonsingular. Noticing rc−1 = rc−1 and Q
3
0; c−1 = 0;
it follows that Q40 and Q
1
0 are nonsingular. Thus Q0c is nonsingular. Whence Q0c=
R1 Q0cEm;−rc−1 is nonsingular.
















with mc rows. By (22) we have
h+c−1P
j=0











It follows immediately that B0; c−1 B1; c−1 : : : Bh+c−1; c−1 0 0




Let Bjc=0m;m; j= h+ 1; : : : ; h+ c. By (21) we have
R1R2R3
 B0; c−1 B1; c−1 : : : Bh+c−1; c−1 0 0








1; c−1 : : : B
0
h+c−1; c−1 0 0
0 B
0






= [ 0 B0c : : : Bh+c−2; c Bh+c−1; c Bh+c; c ]:
By (27) we have



















From (20) it follows that
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for some matrices G0 and G00 with m rows. Since R= [Q0c; : : : ; Qc+1; c] and Qc+1; c=0;
(28) yields
[ B0c; : : : ; Bh+c; c] = [Q0c; : : : ; Qcc]
cc+1;
which is equivalent to (23) because Bjc=0 for h+ 16j6h+ c.

















where n is the dimension of  k0 (yi; : : : ; yi−k0). Suppose that (24) holds. Then we have
k+2c−2P
j=0











It follows immediately that A−c+1; c−1 A−c+2;c−1 : : : Ak+c−1; c−1 0 0
0 A−c+1; c−1 : : : Ak+c−2; c−1 Ak+c−1; c−1 0

=R4c−1c+2 : (29)
Let Ajc=0m;n for j>k + 1. By (21) we have
R1R2R3
 A−c+1; c−1 A−c+2;c−1 : : : Ak+c−1; c−1 0 0








−c+2;c−1 : : : A
0
k+c−1; c−1 0 0
0 A
0






= [ A−c; c A−c+1; c : : : Ak+c−2; c Ak+c−1; c Ak+c; c ]:
By (29) we obtain
















From (20) it follows that






for some matrix G with m rows. Since R= [Q0c; : : : ; Qc+1; c] and Qc+1; c=0, (30) yields
[ A−c; c; A−c+1; c; : : : ; Ak+c; c] = [Q0c; : : : ; Qcc]cc+1;
which is equivalent to (25) because Ajc=0 for k + 16j6k + c.
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Theorem 4. Assume that eq0(i) and eq0(i) are the same. Assume that
eq0(i)
Ra[P0]−! eq00(i) Rb[r0]−! eq1(i) Ra[P1]−!    (31)
Rb[r−2]−! eq−1(i) Ra[P−1]−! eq0−1(i)
Rb[r−1]−! eq(i)



































Furthermore, if (32) is linear, then 2 rj = rj for 06j6− 1 and Q0 is nonsingular.
Proof. Since eq0(i) and eq0(i) are the same, (22) holds in case of c=1; where Q00
is the identity matrix. Repeatedly applying Lemma 1  times for c from 1 to ; we
obtain the theorem.
Theorem 5. Let M = hX; Y; Y k X h; ; i be an (h; k)-order memory nite automaton
dened by
yi= c0 + [A1; : : : ; Ak ] 
y; i−1
k0 ; k−1 + [B0; : : : ; Bh] 
x; i
h0 ; h; i=0; 1; : : : ; (33)
where k 06k; h06h; xi−h−1; : : : ; xi−h−h0 and yi−k−1; : : : ; yi−k−k0 are dumb variables.
Let eq0(i) and eq0(i) be the same and equivalent to the equation
− yi + c0 + [A1; : : : ; Ak ] y; i−1k0 ; k−1 + [B0; : : : ; Bh] x; ih0 ; h=0: (34)
Then we have:
(a) If (32) holds and B0 h0(xi; : : : ; xi−h0) as a function of xi is an injection, then for
any linear (31), B0 h0(xi; : : : ; xi−h0) as a function of xi is an injection.
(b) If (32) holds and B0 h0(xi; : : : ; xi−h0) as a function of xi is a surjection, then for
any linear (31), B0 h0(xi; : : : ; xi−h0) as a function of xi is a surjection.
2 Another proof of rj = rj is to use relevant results on linear nite automata described in [4, 24]. But our
proof here is the most straightforward one.
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Proof. (a) Suppose that (32) holds and that B0 h0(xi; : : : ; xi−h0) as a function of xi is
an injection. From Theorem 4, there exists an mm matrix Q0 over GF(q) such that
B0=Q0B0. It follows immediately that B0 h0(xi; : : : ; xi−h0) as a function of xi is an
injection.
(b) The proof is similar to that of part (a); just by replacing \injection" by \surjec-
tion".
Note: If for any linear (31), B0 h0(xi; : : : ; xi−h0) as a function of xi is a surjection,
then for any parameters x(i− 1); : : : ; x(i− r); y(i+ ); : : : ; y(i− t); the equation eq(i)
has a solution x(i). If for any linear (31), B0 h0(xi; : : : ; xi−h0) as a function of xi is
an injection, then for any parameters x(i − 1); : : : ; x(i − r); y(i + ); : : : ; y(i − t); the
equation eq(i) has at most one solution x(i).
4.3. On weak keys
A public key C0(Mn; : : : ; M0) is said to be weak, if a weak inverse of it can be
obtained by linear Ra Rb transformation method. For n=1; we knew the following
cases are weak: linear M0; 0 step delay M1 [6, 20, 1]; linear M0; quasi-linear M1 [19];
linear M0; M1 of which a weak inverse can be obtained by linear Ra Rb transformation
method [19, 14, 5]. The latter is a more general case. In this subsection, we give relevant
results (cf. Theorem 6).
Let X; Y 0 and Y be column vector spaces over GF(q) of dimensions l; m0 and m;
respectively. For c>0; let 1eqc(i) be
fc(yi+c; : : : ; yi) + [F0c; : : : ; Fh1 ;c] 
x; i
h1 ; h1 = 0 (35)
and let 1eq0c(i) be
f0c (yi+c; : : : ; yi) + [F
0
0c; : : : ; F
0
h1 ; c] 
x; i
h1 ; h1 = 0;
where Fjc and F 0jc have m
0 rows, yj and xj are in Y 0 and X; respectively.
For c>0; let 0eqc(i) be








and let 0eq0c(i) be
’0c(yi+c; : : : ; yi−k) + [B
0










where Bjc and B0jc are mm0 matrices, yj and xj are in Y and Y 0; respectively.
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Let h= h0 + h1. In this subsection, for c>0; let eqc(i) be
c(yi+c; : : : ; yi−k) + [C0c; : : : ; Chc] 
x; i
h1 ; h=0 (37)
and let eq0c(i) be
0c(yi+c; : : : ; yi−k) + [C
0




h1 ; h=0; (38)
where Cjc and C0jc have m rows, yj and xj are in Y and X; respectively.















with m0(h0 + r) rows.
Lemma 2. Let c > 0 and










[C0c; : : : ; Chc] = [B0c; : : : ; Bh0 ; c] h+1: (43)
Proof. Let R1 =Em; rc−1 ; R2 = [0m; rc−1Em 0m;m−rc−1 ]; R3 = DIAPc−1 ;2. By (41), we have
R1R2R3

B0; c−1 B1; c−1 : : : Bh0 ; c−1 0






1; c−1 : : : B
0
h0 ; c−1 0






= [0 B0c : : : Bh0−1; c Bh0 ; c]: (44)
We now prove that (42) is a Ra Rb transformation sequence. It is sucient to prove
that the last m− rc−1 rows of Pc−1C0; c−1 are 0. Let C00; c−1 =Pc−1C0; c−1. Since (40)
yields C0; c−1 =B0; c−1F0; we have C00; c−1 =B
0
0; c−1F0. From (41), it is easy to see that
the last m − rc−1 rows of B00; c−1 are 0. It follows immediately that the last m − rc−1
rows of C00; c−1 are 0.
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Since (42) holds, we have
R1R2R3

C0; c−1 C1; c−1 : : : Ch; c−1 0






1; c−1 : : : C
0
h; c−1 0






= [0 C0c : : : Ch−1; c Chc]:
From (40) and (44), it follows that
[0C0c : : : Ch−1; cChc]
= R1R2R3

B0; c−1 B1; c−1 : : : Bh0 ; c−1 0
0 B0; c−1 : : : Bh0−1; c−1 Bh0 ; c−1

 h+2
= [0 B0c : : : Bh0−1; c Bh0 ; c] h+2:
Therefore, (43) holds.




F0c : : : Fh1 ;c
. . . : : :
. . .
F0c : : : Fh1 ;c
3
75 (45)
with m0(h0 + r + 1) rows.
Lemma 3. Assume that 0 >0; c > 0;
[C0;0+c−1; : : : ; Ch+c−1; 0+c−1]= [Q0; c−1; : : : ; Qh0+c−1;c−1] 
c−1
h+c ; (46)





then there exist P0+c−1 and r0+c−1 such that
eq0+c−1(i)
Ra[ P0+c−1]−! eq00+c−1(i)
Rb[ r0+c−1]−! eq0+c(i) (48)
and there exist Q0c; : : : ; Qh0+c; c such that
[C0;0+c; : : : ; Ch+c; 0+c] = [Q0c; : : : ; Qh0+c; c] 
c
h+c+1
and the rank of Q0c is min(m;m0); where Ch+j; 0+c=0 for j > 0.
Proof. In case of m>m0; the rank of Q0; c−1P−1c−1 is m
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be a nonsingular mm matrix, where P0 is an (m−m0)m matrix and (Q0; c−1P−1c−1)−1
is a left inverse of Q0; c−1P−1c−1. In case of m < m
0; the rank of Q0; c−1P−1c−1 is m. Let
P0+c−1 be the inverse matrix of the submatrix of the leftmost and maximally linearly
independent columns of Q0; c−1P−1c−1; and r0+c−1 be the rank of the rst rc−1 columns
of Q0; c−1P−1c−1.
Let R1 =Em; r0+c−1 ; R2 = [0m; r0+c−1Em0m;m− r0+c−1 ]; R3 =DIA P0+c−1 ;2;
R4 =

Q0; c−1 Q1; c−1 : : : Qh0+c−1;c−1 0 0




R5 =DIAP−1c−1 ; h0+c+2; R6 =Em





6 =Em0(h0+c+2);−rc−1 ; R
−1
7 =DIAEm0 ;rc−1 ;h0+c+2.
Let R=R1R2R3R4R5R6R7. Partition R= [Q0c; : : : ; Qh0+c+1; c]; where Qjc has m
0
columns. We prove that Qh0+c+1; c is 0 and that the rank of Q0c is min(m;m
0). For




















where Q1j; c−1 and Q
4
j; c−1 are r0+c−1  rc−1 and (m− r0+c−1) (m0 − rc−1) matrices,





1; c−1 : : : Q
0
h0+c−1;c−1 0 0
















2 : : :Q
4













h0+c−1 0 0 0

:
We now prove that Q30; c−1 = 0 and that ranks of Q
1
0; c−1 and Q
4
0; c−1 are rc−1 and
m0−rc−1 in case of m>m0; or r0+c−1 and m− r0+c−1 in case of m < m0; respectively.
Since P0+c−1 and Pc−1 are nonsingular and the rank of Q0; c−1 is min(m;m
0); the rank
of Q00; c−1 is min(m;m
0). In case of m>m0; from the denition of P0+c−1; it is easy
to see that the last m0 rows of Q00; c−1 is Em0 . From m
0 − rc−1 =m− r0+c−1; it is easy
to see that Q30; c−1 = 0 and that ranks of Q
1
0; c−1 and Q
4
0; c−1 are rc−1 and m
0 − rc−1;
respectively. In case of m < m0; from the denition of P0+c−1; it is easy to see
that Q00; c−1 is the reduced echelon matrix [2] of Q0; c−1P
−1
c−1. It follows immediately
that Q30; c−1 = 0 and that ranks of Q
1
0; c−1 and Q
4
0; c−1 are r0+c−1 and m − r0+c−1;
respectively. Let R2R3R4R5R6 = [ Q0c; : : : ; Qh0+c+1; c]; where Qjc has m
0 columns. Since
Q30; c−1 = 0 yields Qh0+c+1; c=0; we obtain Qh0+c+1; c=R1 Qh0+c+1; cEm0 ;−rc−1 = 0. Since
ranks of Q10; c−1 and Q
4
0; c−1 are rc−1 and m
0 − rc−1 in case of m>m0; or r0+c−1 and
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has rank min(m;m0). Thus Q0c=R1 Q0cEm0 ;−rc−1 has rank min(m;m
0).




F 00; c−1 F
0
1; c−1 : : : F
0
h1 ; c−1











F 00; c−1 F
0

















for some matrices G0 and G00 with m0 rows. Since R= [Q0c; : : : ; Qh0+c+1; c] and







h+c+2 = [Q0c; : : : ; Qh0+c; c] [0;  
c
h+c+1]: (49)
We now prove that for P0+c−1 and r0+c−1; (48) is a Ra Rb transformation sequence.
It is sucient to prove that the last m − r0+c−1 rows of P0+c−1C0;0+c−1 are 0. Let
C00;0+c−1 = P0+c−1C0;0+c−1. Since (46) yields C0;0+c−1 =Q0; c−1F0;c−1; we have







Since Q30; c−1 = 0 and the last m
0− rc−1 rows of F 00; c−1 are 0, the last m− r0+c−1 rows
of C00;0+c−1 are 0.
Since (48) holds and Ch+j; 0+c−1 = 0 for j > 0; we have
R1R2R3

C0;0+c−1 C1; 0+c−1 : : : Ch+c−1; 0+c−1 0 0






1; 0+c−1 : : : C
0
h+c−1; 0+c−1 0 0






= [0 C0;0+c : : : Ch+c−2; 0+c Ch+c−1; 0+c 0] (50)
and Ch+j; 0+c=0 for j > 0. On the other side, from (46), we obtain
R1R2R3

C0;0+c−1 C1; 0+c−1 : : : Ch+c−1; 0+c−1 0 0
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From (50) and (49), we then have









= [Q0c; : : : ; Qh0+c; c] [0;  
c
h+c+1];
where Ch+c; 0+c=0. It follows immediately that




























If the rank of B00 in 0eq0 (i) is min(m;m








and Q01 ; : : : ; Qh0+1 ;1 with = 0 + 1 such that
[C0; : : : ; Ch+1 ; ] = [Q01 ; : : : ; Qh0+1 ;1 ] 
1
h+1+1 (54)
and the rank of Q01 is min(m;m
0); where Ch+j; 1 = 0 for j > 0.
Proof. From (51), (40) for c=1 in Lemma 2 holds. From (52), repeatedly using
Lemma 2 0 times, we obtain that
eq0(i)





[C00 ; : : : ; Ch0 ] = [B00 ; : : : ; Bh0 ; 0 ] 
0
h+1: (56)
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Let Qj0 =Bj0 for 06j6h0. Since the rank of B00 is min(m;m
0); the rank of Q00 is
min(m;m0). Clearly, (56) yields (46) for c=1 in Lemma 3. From (53), repeatedly
using Lemma 3 1 times, we obtain that there exist
eq0 (i)
Ra[ P0 ]−! eq00 (i)
Rb[ r0 ]−! eq0+1(i)




and Q01 ; : : : ; Qh0+1 ;1 with = 0 + 1 such that (54) holds and the rank of Q01 is
min(m;m0); where Ch+j; 1 = 0 for j > 0. Letting Pj =Pj and rj = rj for 06j60 − 1;
from (55) and (57), the lemma is immediate.
Let M0 = hY 0; Y; S0; 0; 0i be an (h0; k)-order memory quasi-linear nite automaton
dened by







75 ; i=0; 1; : : : : (58)
Let M1 = hX; Y 0; S1; 1; 1i be an h1-order input memory nite automaton dened by
y0i =f(xi; : : : ; xi−h1 ); i=0; 1; : : : : (59)
Express f in the form of
f(xi; : : : ; xi−h1 ) =f0 + [F0; : : : ; Fh1 ] 
x; i
h1 ; h1 ;





Bjf0; [C0; C1; : : : ; Ch0+h1 ] = [B0; B1; : : : ; Bh0 ] h+1: (60)
From the denition of compound nite automata, C0(M1; M0)= hX; Y; Y k  X h; ; i is
dened by
yi= c0 + ’out(yi−1; : : : ; yi−k) + [C0; : : : ; Ch] 
x; i
h1 ; h; i=0; 1; : : : ;
where h= h0 + h1; and xi−h−1; : : : ; xi−h−h1 are dumb variables.
Theorem 6. Let nite automata M0 and M1 be dened by (58) and (59), respectively.
Let 1eq0(i) be equivalent to the equation
− yi + f0 + [F0; : : : ; Fh1 ] x; ih1 ; h1 = 0; (61)
where yj and xj are in Y 0 and X; respectively. Let eq0(i) be equivalent to the equation
− yi + c0 + ’out(yi−1; : : : ; yi−k) + [C0; : : : ; Ch] x; ih1 ; h=0; (62)
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where yj and xj are in Y and X; respectively. If (53) holds; then:
(a) If F01 h1 (xi; : : : ; xi−h1) in 1eq1 (i) as a function of xi is an injection and if M0









with = 0 + 1; C0 h1 (xi; : : : ; xi−h1 ) in eq(i) as a function of xi is an injection.
(b) If F01 h1 (xi; : : : ; xi−h1 ) in 1eq1 (i) as a function of xi is a surjection and if M0
is a weak inverse with delay 0; then for any linear Ra Rb transformation se-
quence (63) with = 0 + 1; C0 h1 (xi; : : : ; xi−h1 ) in eq(i) as a function of xi is
a surjection.
Proof. (a) Suppose that M0 is weakly invertible with delay 0. Then m>m0. Let 0eq0(i)
be equivalent to the equation








where yj and xj are in Y and Y 0, respectively. By Theorem 2 in [3], there exists a
linear Ra Rb transformation sequence (52) such that the rank of B00 in 0eq0 (i) is m
0.
Using (60),(62),(39) and (45), it is easy to see that (51) holds. From Lemma 4, there
exist (32) and Q01 ; : : : ; Qh0+1 ;1 with = 0 + 1 such that
[ C0; : : : ; Ch+1 ; ] = [Q01 ; : : : ; Qh0+1 ; 1 ] 
1
h+1+1 (64)
holds and the rank of Q01 is m
0; where eq0(i) is eq0(i). Clearly, (64) yields C0=
Q01F01 . Since F01 h1 (xi; : : : ; xi−h1 ) in 1eq1 (i) as a function of xi is an injection, we
obtain that C0 h1 (xi; : : : ; xi−h1 ) in eq(i) as a function of xi is an injection. From
Theorem 5, for any linear Ra Rb transformation sequence (63), C0 h1 (xi; : : : ; xi−h1 ) in
eq(i) as a function of xi is an injection.
(b) Proof of part (b) is similar to that of part (a). What we need to do is to
replace the phrases \weakly invertible", \m", \m0", \Theorem 2 in [3]" and \injection"
in the proof of part (a) with \a weak inverse", \m0", \m", \Theorem 1 in [3]" and
\surjection", respectively.
4.4. Two remarks on other linear attacks
4.4.1. On attack by reduced echelon matrix
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1(−1); : : : ; E0−1eq0−1(1); E0eq0(0); E000 eq00(0); E001 eq01(0); : : : ; E00 eq0(0).
Furthermore, the coecient matrix with respect to  x; i+h1 ;  in the system of equations






































































































P00 P01 : : : P0;−1 P0 P0;+1
0 P11 : : : P1; −1 P1 P1; +1
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
0 0 : : : P−1; −1 P−1;  P−1; +1
0 0 : : : 0 P P; +1
0 0 : : : 0 0 P+1; +1
3
77777775
such that P 0 is the reduced echelon matrix of  ; where Pcc is a rc  rc matrix and
PccE0cC
0




0c; rc is the number of rows of E
0
c; for
c=0; : : : ; . It follows that in the reduced echelon matrix of   the submatrix of rows
r0 +   + r−1 + 1 to r0 +   + r is in the form of
[0; : : : ; 0; C0; C1; : : : ; Ch]
and C0 =PE0C
0









it is easy to show that C0 h1 (xi; : : : ; xi−h1 ) as a function of xi is an injection if and only
if C0 h1 (xi; : : : ; xi−h1 ) as a function of xi is an injection, and that C0 h1 (xi; : : : ; xi−h1 )
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as a function of xi is a surjection if and only if C0 h1 (xi; : : : ; xi−h1 ) as a function
of xi is a surjection and r=m. From this observation, if some inversion method by
reduced echelon matrix based on injectiveness (or surjectiveness) of C0 h1 (xi; : : : ; xi−h1 )
is applicable to C0(M1; M0), 3 so is the Ra Rb method described in this paper. But the
method of reduced echelon matrix for nding weak inverse of C0(M1; M0) is more
complex than Ra Rb method,  + 1 equations vs. one equation, and not necessary to
include such a check process in key-generator from the above discussion.
In case of that the rst l rows of  h1 (xi; : : : ; xi−h1 ) are xi and entries in rows >l of








C C−1 : : : C0
3
7775 (65)
is [ D0; 0; : : : ; 0] and D0 =El. Ref. [14] uses the method of reducing matrix (65) to
its reduced echelon matrix to analyse a kind of weak keys of FAPKC3. Ref. [29]
discusses relation between their method and the linear Ra Rb transformation method,
and proves that if a key of FAPKC3 can be broken by the method of reduced echelon
matrix described in [14], then it can be also broken by the linear Ra Rb transformation
method, but the inverse proposition does not hold.
4.4.2. On attack by canonical diagonal form -matrix
Ref. [5] uses the canonical diagonal form -matrix method to analyse the kind of
weak keys of FAPKC3 discussed in [14]. 4 In [28], Ra Rb relations between linear Ra Rb
transformation over -matrix and canonical diagonal form of -matrix are investigated.
From Theorem 3 in [28], for a -matrix C0() with rank r; let C0()=P()D()Q()
3 We can multiply   with a nonsingular matrix P from the left to obtain its reduced echelon matrix, take
then its submatrix of rows r0 +    + r−1 + 1 to r0 +    + r which is equal to [0; : : : ; 0; C0; C1; : : : ; Ch]
because the reduced echelon matrix of a matrix is unique [2, p. 187], and take the submatrix of rows
r0 +    + r−1 + 1 to r0 +    + r of
P
2
4 −yi+ + c0 + ’out(yi+−1; : : : ; yi+−k)...
−yi + c0 + ’out(yi−1; : : : ; yi−k)
3
5 ;
denoted by ’(yi+; : : : ; yi−k). If for any xi−1; : : : ; xi−h1 ; C0 h1 (xi; : : : ; xi−h1 ) as a function of xi is an injec-
tion, from Theorem 4 in [23] but replacing eq(i) by ’(yi+; : : : ; yi−k)+
Ph
j=0
Cj h1 (xi−j ; : : : ; xi−j−h1 ) = 0,
we then obtain a weak inverse Meq with delay  of C
0(M1; M0).
4 In [5, p. 88], an equivalent denition of weak inverse with delay  of an input-memory nite automaton
is mentioned without proof. It would seem that a proof of equivalence of the two denitions does not exist,
at least nontrivial, from the viewpoint of mathematical logic. Correctness of several propositions depends
on this equivalence. But no proof of any proposition is given in [5]. Notice that the main result in [5] that
both encryption and signature of a kind of weak keys of FAPKC3 are insecure can be immediately deduced
from [19], using the result of [14].
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be a canonical diagonal form decomposition and Q() be the rst r rows of Q();
let Ct() be the result of a terminating and elementary Ra Rb transformation sequence
of C0() and Q() the rst r rows of Ct(). Then there exists an invertible -matrix
R() such that
Q()=R() Q():
This result deduces that if a key can be broken by the canonical diagonal form -matrix
method, then it can be also broken by the linear Ra Rb transformation method. Thus it
is not necessary to include a more complex check process based on reducing canonical
diagonal form -matrix in the key-generator.
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